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Introduction
An important element of the recent reforms of the health care system in England has been the introduction of private-sector providers alongside National Health Service (NHS) ones. Thus, 36 Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) from the private sector have been contracted by the NHS, in two waves since 2002, to provide elective surgery and diagnostic procedures to NHS patients. Although health care remains free to the patient, it may be provided by a private, for-profit hospital or by a public-sector (i.e., NHS) hospital. The use of ISTCs is intended to increase capacity in order to cut waiting lists for routine procedures. Patients, advised by their General Practitioners (GPs) are also gradually being offered an increased degree of choice among providers 1 . More generally, some of the aims of the introduction of private-sector providers have been to encourage cost reductions and promote innovation and responsiveness to patients throughout the health care system (Allen 2009 ). Private, for-profit organizations are generally thought to have greater incentives to minimise costs than public sector ones. There is evidence that management practices in ISTCs are on average closer to manufacturing good practice than in NHS hospitals (Bloom et al. 2009 ) a difference which could reflect stronger incentives to control costs in ISTCs. However, the effect of ownership on service quality is less certain. International empirical findings on the compared clinical quality of for-profit, non-profit and state-owned hospitals are inconclusive (see, e.g., Sloan et al. 2001 , Eggleston et al. 2008 , Lien et al 2008 . A growing body of literature suggests that profit incentives may have complex effects in public service provision. Certain aspects of quality may be undersupplied by private firms commissioned to provide public services, while in other areas quality may improve with for-profit supply, depending on the contracting situation, the incentives provided to staff and staff motivation (Hart et al. 1997 , Bénabou and Tirole 2006 , Besley and Ghatak, 2003 .
In this paper, we use new patient experience survey data to examine whether hospital ownership has an effect on the level of quality reported by patients in the areas of information and interpersonal care, respect for privacy, dignity, and hospitality and delays. We also investigate whether different aspects of patients' experience are affected in different ways by hospital ownership. Severe informational asymmetries imply that patients may not always be well placed to assess the clinical 1 For a review of the competition aspect of the reforms, see Sussex (2009). 3 quality of health care. However, other dimensions of care quality such as cleanliness or privacy can be observed by patients. Indeed, it can be argued that certain aspects of quality are best measured by patients, as for example whether patients are given explanations they can understand about the operation or side-effects of medication, or whether they are treated with dignity. The data we use come from surveys carried out annually among in-patients of NHS hospitals by the Care Quality Commission and among ISTC patients by the Department of Health. The surveys cover large samples of patients in both state and for-profit hospitals and include identical questions about the patient's experience, ranging from the cleanliness of facilities and food quality to explanations provided by medical staff, delays, privacy and dignity 2 . The data also include information about patients' characteristics, their state of health and overall area of treatment (hospital specialty).
Our approach is to use multivariate regression-an approach still relatively little used with patient experience data (Glick 2009)--in order to test whether hospital ownership affects the quality of the experience reported by patients once we take into account observed patient characteristics and other relevant factors that may influence the quality of patients' reported experience. In particular, we control for the selection of patients into one of the two sectors and for confounding factors associated with unobserved individual hospitals' characteristics. Quality is measured using scores constructed from patients' answers along several "domains" of care quality defined by the Care Quality Commission from some of the survey questions, as well as three dimensions we identify using factor analysis on the whole data set. We estimate a switching regression model in order to test not only for an overall effect of ownership on the level of quality, but also for the possibility that public and private hospitals deliver quality differently, so that patients' characteristics, selfrated state of health, length of stay and hospital specialty play a different role in determining the level of quality reported by patients in public and private hospitals. ISTCs have been contracted to treat routine cases, while patients with more severe, complex or risky conditions, which may affect the quality of their reported experience, are directed to NHS hospitals. Non-random factors, such as co-morbidity and risk, can therefore cause individual patients to be referred to a public or to a private hospital. We incorporate this selection into the model. Finally, we use hospital fixed effects to control for unobserved hospital-specific characteristics such as resources or the age of the premises that are not systematically related to ownership but may be correlated with it and affect patient-observed quality (for example by influencing staffing levels or spare capacity). Hospital fixed effects keep these unobserved hospital-specific characteristics constant and focus the analysis 2 The surveys do not cover clinical quality or the effectiveness and safety of emergency procedures. 4 on variations among patients in each hospital (Glick 2009 ). Our approach thus makes it possible to isolate ownership effects from the components of the level of care quality reported by patients that are attributable to observed and unobserved patient characteristics determining the choice of hospital and unobserved hospital-specific characteristics that are present in both public-and privatesector hospitals but may be relatively more frequent in one of the two sectors (such as new premises, for example) for reasons other than ownership.
We find that the experience reported by patients in public and private hospitals is different, i.e., most dimensions of quality are delivered differently by the two types of hospitals, with each sector performing better in some areas of quality in certain specialties and/or for certain groups of patients.
However, the sum of all ownership effects is not statistically different from zero at sample means.
In other words, hospital ownership in and of itself does not affect the level of quality of the average patient's reported experience. Differences in average quality levels reported by patients in the private and public sectors are entirely attributable to patient characteristics, the selection of patients into public or private hospitals and hospital-specific characteristics that are not systematically dependent on ownership.
Theoretical hypotheses and their applicability to the case of NHS hospitals and ISTCs are briefly reviewed in the next section. The data, empirical issues and our empirical strategy are presented in Section 3, the empirical model in Section 4 and our findings in Section 5. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
Ownership and Quality of Care
Hart et al. (1997) argue that in a for-profit organization contracted by a government to provide public services on the basis of a fixed fee for service the incentive to minimise costs will dominate incentives to innovate and improve quality (for which higher prices would have to be negotiated).
As a result, the private provider will under-supply quality in areas where the level of quality is not specified in precise terms in the "contract" (the set of regulations applying to the private contractor) but is directly related to costs 3 . If reducing costs does not damage quality, the private firm will supply higher quality in that model. On the other hand, if there is little opportunity to reduce costs and public sector employees are able to derive significant benefits from improvements in quality, public provision may dominate (ibid). A key feature of this model is that demand comes from state procurement rather than directly from the consumers of the service, so that the for-profit provider has little incentive to respond to consumer demand in areas that are not fully specified in its contract with the government.
The ISTCs are all for-profit providers. They have been contracted by the NHS for five years to provide routine procedures, with the more severe or complex cases being directed to NHS hospitals.
The contracts are of the form assumed by Hart et al (ibid.), namely, offering a fee for a certain number of procedures 4 . No incentives related to quality or outcomes were provided for in the contracts of either phase (Sussex 2009 ) though financial penalties could be imposed in case of persistent problems (King's Fund 2009). However, the prices received by ISTCs are not the same as in the public sector. In the first wave (26 contracts) ISTCs were guaranteed payment for a certain number of procedures, regardless of whether they were all carried out. The price paid to ISTCs included a provider-specific premium over and above the price paid to NHS hospitals in order to reflect entry costs. On average, the prices received by ISTCs were 11.2% higher per procedure than the NHS equivalent 5 if the contract was fully used. By 2008, it seemed only about 85% of the procedures contracted for were actually carried out on average (Department of Health 2008a) which would result in an average price 28.9% higher than the NHS cost. The second wave of ISTC contracts only guaranteed payment for a certain minimum number of procedures lower than the total contract. If the minimum was fully used the price per procedure worked out at about 7.3% lower than average NHS costs, but if significantly less procedures were carried out the price would be higher than the NHS equivalent (Sussex 2009 Hart et al. (1997) . While being difficult to specify, providing information to patients in a way that will satisfy them may require costly staff time and perhaps training. Given that referral decisions have tended to be made primarily by GPs or to be constrained by supply rather than entirely determined by patient preferences, profit objectives may therefore cause private providers to undersupply quality in the area of patient information, all else being equal, with for example lower staffing levels, spare capacity or qualifications. On the other hand, the prospect of increased patient choice may also provide ISTCs with sufficient incentives to supply increased quality in areas in which it can be measured by patients.
Better quality may be provided by the public sector if state employees are more intrinsically motivated and choose to work for organizations that will not expropriate in the form of profit the social benefits accruing from their work (Grout and Stevens 2003, Besley and Ghatak 2003) . This possibility is ignored in the model proposed by Hart et al. (1997) though it can be accommodated in that model as one of the cases in which government employees receive high rewards from improving quality (a case only envisaged with extrinsic incentives in the model).
A growing body of international evidence indicates that public sector employees are more likely than private sector ones to have values consistent with intrinsic motivation (e.g., Lyons et al 2006, Lewis and Frank 2002) . In the UK, strong evidence indicates that employees are more likely to act like intrinsically motivated agents in the public sector, including the NHS, because that sector attracts more intrinsically motivated people than the private for-profit sector (Georgellis et al 2011 , Gregg et al 2011 . Studies of motivation in UK (public) Hospital Trusts have shown intrinsic motivation to be present not only among consultants (specialists) but also Trust managers (Mannion et al 2007) . However, Trust managers were found to be a heterogeneous group from the point of view of intrinsic motivation and the balance of intrinsic and other motivation depended on the individual and local circumstances (Crilly and Le Grand 2004) . At other levels, there have been regulatory limitations on ISTCs' capacity to hire NHS staff. Although these restrictions have been 7 partly lifted (Sussex 2009 ) they may explain the better part of any differences between NHS and private-sector staff in this particular part of the health care industry at the time at which the data we use were collected. Self-selection along intrinsic motivation and preference for the public sector may therefore not be a major feature differentiating NHS staff from private-sector staff here (for example, extrinsically motivated staff with the NHS may not have been able to join the private sector, although moves into the NHS from the private sector would have been possible).
Intrinsic motivation needs to be supported by certain conditions, such as autonomy, recognition and respect, in order to flourish (Frey and Jegen 2005, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2007) and extrinsic incentives can be counterproductive with intrinsically motivated agents (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole 2006 , Besley and Ghatak 2003 , Frey and Jegen 2005 . Mannion et al (2007) suggest that the recent reforms did not always provide senior Trust managers with the degree of genuine autonomy or recognition that would foster intrinsic motivation 8 . However, the nature of incentives may still differ between the two sectors, with more incentives to cut costs provided to senior staff in the private sector.
The predictions of the theoretical literature regarding the compared quality of care provided in the two sectors as it is measured by patients' perceptions are therefore ambiguous, with the possible exception of cost-related but imprecisely regulated aspects of quality like patient information. Patient experience data have not always been found to be systematically related to key aspects of clinical quality (Glick 2009 , Leonard 2008 . However, this type of data is appropriate to assess other aspects of quality that are observed by patients. Because many of the questions are of a subjective nature, as for example questions about how the patients rate their care, this type of data may not provide the most precise estimate of absolute levels of care quality at a particular time-though surveys administered some time after discharge from hospital, as here, are less subject to the "courtesy bias" that inflates answers in exit surveys administered as the patient leaves the hospital.
Data, Empirical Issues and Approach

Data
The measures of quality provided by patient experience data may incorporate varying patient expectations, though the limited effect of social and demographic patient characteristics (for which we control here) on this type of measure of quality suggests it does not simply reflect the expectations of different groups of patients (Hall and Dornan 1990, Westaway et al 2003) . The interpersonal quality of care, in particular, seems reliably measured by patient experience (Kane et al 1997) . In addition, patient experience survey data are sensitive to differences in quality among patients treated by the same provider and are reliable for analysing the determinants of patient satisfaction and making comparisons across providers (Leonard 2008 , Glick 2009 . Table 1 shows the average scores obtained in our sample by NHS hospitals and ISTCs on each of the 39 questions on the (non-clinical) quality of care experienced by the respondents that are common to the two surveys 10 . Answers have been coded so as to obtain scores that always increase with better quality (see Appendix A1 for survey questions and coding). Overall, the scores obtained by both types of hospitals are very high, in line with findings elsewhere (see, e.g., Nguyen Thi et al 2002 , Säilä et al 2008 . On all but one question, patients report a better experience in the private sector, and all the differences are statistically significant. The one exception concerns having to share a room with members of the opposite sex, which is significantly less frequently reported by patients in NHS hospitals than in ISTCs.
Empirical Issues
In order to assess whether these differences are the effect of hospital ownership or of other factors such as patients' characteristics, the choice that assigns certain types of cases to one sector or the other, or the individual hospitals' characteristics, two key issues have to be addressed. The first issue is how to aggregate the data corresponding to different questions to make the analysis manageable and meaningful. Although the Care Quality Commission groups survey questions into five domains designed to capture particular areas of quality, the groupings are to a certain extent arbitrary, take no account of possible statistical relationships between questions and only include about half the survey questions. The second issue is that confounding factors that affect patient experience are correlated with hospital ownership but not due to ownership. These confounding factors may bias our estimates and produce spurious "ownership effects". Thus, we need to take into account the fact that different types of patients are selected into the two different types of hospitals (with lighter cases, which may be easier and/or cheaper to treat, directed to ISTCs for routine procedures and more severe cases to NHS hospitals). We also need to control for characteristics of individual hospitals that are not observed in the survey but may affect the quality of patient experience, because they may be partially correlated with ownership but due to other factors. For example, the prices paid by the NHS to ISTCs were higher for the first wave of ISTCs than the prices received at that time by NHS hospitals; but the second wave of ISTCs may receive a higher or a lower price than NHS hospitals given the changes introduced in ISTC contracts between the two waves (see Sussex 2009 ). As a result, hospital resources may vary in a way that is correlated with ownership. The ISTCs also seem to have carried out a lower number of operations 10 than they were contracted for, so that they may have had more spare capacity than NHS hospitals, and perhaps extra staff time. It is possible that private sector hospitals also have newer premises on average, given their recent entry, and thus look cleaner or more pleasant.
We now turn to the way we have dealt with each of these empirical issues.
Aggregation of Survey Questions
The large number of survey questions means it might be difficult to interpret results if we were to analyse each individual question separately. We have aggregated answers in two different ways.
We first used the groups of questions defined by the Care Quality Commission. The CQC identifies five domains of patient experience, into which 20 different questions are grouped, their scores being averaged to obtain five corresponding indexes of quality. The first index of experience quality, entitled "access and waiting" (hereafter "access") includes scores on changes in admission date, the patients' feeling about the time spent on a waiting list, and about the time spent waiting to get a bed once in the hospital (see Appendix A2 for the questions in each domain). The second domain, "safe, high quality, coordinated care" ("coordination") aggregates scores on whether there were contradictions between statements made by different members of staff, discharge was delayed, and whether the patient was given explanations about danger signals after leaving the hospital. The third domain, "better information, more choice" ("information") includes scores on patients' involvement in their care and on explanations they've received about medication and its side effects. The fourth domain, "building relationships" ("relationships") refers to scores on answers from doctors and nurses to patients' questions and whether doctors and nurses talk in front of the patient as if the patient weren't there. The last domain, "clean, comfortable, friendly place to be" ("comfort") aggregates scores on noise, cleanliness, quality of food, privacy, respect and dignity, and help in controlling pain.
In order to aggregate the answers to all the questions asked within each domain, possible relationships between questions need to be taken into account. For example, if two questions actually measure the same thing, giving each the same weight as all the other questions in the average score computed for a given domain will amount to asking the same question twice. In order to take into account these possible relationships, we use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the scores on the individual questions in each dimension. The scores on each of the five Care Quality Commission domains were originally computed as simple averages of the scores for each of the questions the CQC had decided to include in the particular domain. For each of the CQC domains, the PCA score we present is the linear combination of the scores on the questions included in that dimension which captures the maximum variability of these original question scores. The resulting principal component scores for the five dimensions produce the same ranking of hospitals as the ranking obtained with the average scores used by the CQC 11 . We use these five principal components scores as dependent variables in our regression analyses.
The second approach we use to aggregate questions is factor analysis. The objective of this approach is to find a meaningful way of aggregating all the questions. While the five domains defined by the CQC (which only cover 20 questions) are to a certain extent arbitrary, factor analysis makes it possible to identify patterns in the relationships between questions that define dimensions of care quality emerging from the dataset, using all the questions available. The dimensions identified, or "factors", describe the variability of the data and reflect common underlying factors.
The factors and the way each question enters each factor can then be used to aggregate questions.
The score on each of these factors is a linear combination of the scores obtained on the individual questions where the coefficients are "factor loadings". The factor loadings measure the strength of the linear relationship between the factor and each one of the original question variables and can be interpreted as regression coefficients from a regression of the underlying factor on the original question variables. The first factor is the one that accounts for the largest percentage of the total variance in the data, the second factor the one that accounts for the second largest percentage of the variance, and so on. We carried out a factor analysis on all 39 questions. Table 2 presents the factor loadings of the variables for the first three factors, which together account for 86% of the variance 12 .
Overall, all 39 questions are positively related to each other (suggesting that aggregation is warranted) so that a factor reflecting the all-round quality of the patient's experience (Factor 1) accounts for 69 percent of the variability of the data. A second factor (9.6% of the variance) is dominated by questions on delayed discharge and assigns some negative loadings to questions 11 We have obtained Spearman rank correlations of around 0.99 for each of the five pairs of CQC and principal component scores. To study the relationships among these five experience domains, we have performed a rank correlation test across these domains and observe positive rank correlation among the five areas. The access domain ranks the hospitals from best to worse quite differently to the other domains (rank correlation of 0.23). The remaining pairwise correlations range from 0.5 to 0.6. An additional advantage of using PCA scores over simple averages is that the PCA score is a continuous variable with a better approximation to the Normal distribution. about explanations regarding the operation or procedure. This second "prompt discharge factor" may thus score better for hospitals that are better organized (modest positive factor loadings correspond to questions regarding comfort and hospitality). The third factor (7.1% of the variance) assigns the largest positive weights to questions on explanations relating to medicines, the operation, danger signals, side effects, whom to contact in case of problems after discharge, and explanations for delayed discharge. It also assigns high negative weights to questions related to comfort (cleanliness, noise and food). This factor, which we call "more information, less comfort", suggests a pattern according to which some hospitals score well on providing information in different ways to patients, but poorly on comfort aspects, while other hospitals, at the other end of a comfort-information axis, provide a clean and comfortable environment but are generally less good at supplying information. We also use the scores from these three factors as dependent variables in our model to capture other dimensions of experience emerging from the variability of the data.
In addition to being useful ways of aggregating questions, scores are continuous, which allows us to use estimation methods that deal with unobserved hospital characteristics.
Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate the effect of hospital ownership on scores in our eight dimensions (the five CQC areas and the three dimensions of experience quality identified by factor analysis) while controlling for patient and hospital characteristics (including gender, age, state of health, etc) we use multivariate regression. Dependent variables are the set of principal-component and factoranalysis scores obtained in the eight dimensions. As explanatory variables in the model, we include some of patients' demographic characteristics--gender and interval of age. We also observe the treatment specialty. To control for the severity of the patient's medical condition we use the patient's self-assessment of health, ranging from worst at 1 to best at 6, and length of stay at the hospital. This is a standard specification (Kane et al 1997, Quintana et al 2006) . If the state of health and length of stay of the patient are affected by the quality of care, estimates of their effect on care quality may be biased. This might be the case if the dependent variables measured clinical quality, which may affect both the patients' length of stay and their state of health, but is unlikely to be a major problem here. There is a strong correlation between patients' self-assessed state of health before and after a hospital stay, and patients' rating of the quality of care seems much more strongly affected by the constant component of their state of health (i.e., the severity of their condition) than by changes in their health between the times before and after their hospital stay 13 (Kane et al 1997). We will nonetheless take into account, in our discussion of the results, the possibility that a bias may be present. We insert a dummy variable for ISTCs, and allow all estimated parameters to vary with hospital ownership, in order to test whether there are ownership effects specific to patient groups, hospital specialty, etc. For example, it is possible that more intrinsically motivated staff in the public sector offer better care to groups that are less vocal, like the very old.
The mean scores obtained by NHS and private hospitals in each of the eight dimensions of care quality reported by patients appear on Table 3a (scores are normalized to sum up to zero for the whole sample). As with scores on individual questions, the ISTCs perform better in each of the five CQC areas. However, the picture that comes out of the factor analysis is slightly different. ISTCs offer better all-round quality and less delay in discharge, but provide less satisfactory information to patients, and more comfort, than NHS hospitals, which rate better on information for the same level of comfort and less well on comfort for the same level of information provided to patients. It is interesting to note here that findings are sensitive to the way data for different questions are aggregated. The sample means of the explanatory variables for NHS hospitals and ISTCs are presented in Table 3b . Compared with NHS organisations, ISTCs treat younger patients who are in better health, more often men and stay in hospital for shorter periods of time. This is consistent with other evidence (Browne et al 2008) and with the policy of directing routine cases to ISTCs 13 .
Controlling for possible confounding factors correlated with ownership potentially biasing estimates has now been recognised for a number of years as a crucial issue in studies comparing public-, private-and non-profit sector organizations (see Estrin et al. 2009 , and for healthcare, e.g., Norton 1994 , Sloan et al. 2001 ). Our strategy is to combine two approaches to deal with this problem.
The non-random selection of patients into the two types of hospital may affect patient satisfaction and our explanatory variables may not fully control for this. The ISTC surveys include both inpatients and admitted patients treated as day cases, whereas the NHS surveys do not include day cases. There is a wide variation among NHS trusts in patients' average length of stay and we control for individual patients' length of stay. Unfortunately we have very little explicit information in the data to control for the selection of patients into either of the two types of hospitals. For this reason we cannot fully model either the choice of hospital or the patient's experience as a function of observable patient characteristics, condition, location, etc. as a system of 14 structural equations. We expect that unobservable characteristics entering the stochastic components of patients' experience and of the choice of hospital are correlated with each other and with hospital ownership. In order to estimate the effect of ownership (a binary variable) and allow for its endogeneity, we therefore estimate a two-stage switching regression model with endogenous switching. This approach provides a way of instrumenting the ownership variable while allowing the equations for public-and private-sector hospitals to differ. The method involves a two-stage estimation, in which the first stage is to estimate a probit model of the selection of patients into a public-or private-sector hospital. In the second stage, the estimated probability that the patient attends an ISTC replaces the ISTC dummy variable in the estimation of the patient experience equations. The method has an important robustness property since it does not require the first-stage probit model to be correctly specified (Wooldridge 2002) . However, identification requires an instrument that has predictive power in the choice of hospital, but not in the patient's experience equations (an exclusion restriction). 14 Our second approach is designed to control for other, unobserved aspects of individual hospitals that may also affect patient experience, such as the size of the hospital, its location, etc. Some of these characteristics may be correlated with ownership though not systematically so, such as the hospital's spare capacity, the age of the premises, etc, and need to be controlled for in order to avoid spuriously attributing to ownership differences in reported quality that are caused by other factors.
For example, new hospitals may be easier to clean and look more pleasant to patients. There are new hospitals in both the public and private sectors, but there may be relatively more in the private sector, though not because of ownership but because of the recent entry of private providers into NHS care. An important issue here is the fact that private and public sector hospitals face different prices, which may impact on quality by affecting aspects of hospitals' management that may also be influenced by ownership. Thus, for example, if a second-wave ISTC receives a lower price per procedure than a public hospital, it may, all else being equal, have comparatively lower levels of staffing, qualifications and higher capacity utilization-all differences that could also come from a greater emphasis on cost minimization due to private ownership, and may result in lower quality. In order to avoid such confounding effects, we control for these factors with hospital Fixed Effects, which allow us to keep constant the unobserved characteristics of individual hospitals. 15 Hospital Fixed Effects also provide an additional control for unobserved patient characteristics (if certain types of patients are referred to certain hospitals).
The Empirical Model
We assume that patient i and her GP have a choice between private and public hospitals ( j being the hospital subscript) and that this choice is informed by the observable characteristics of the patient and hospital,  , we can write the basic equations as  capture unobserved patient factors affecting the choice of hospital. Note that we allow the patients' unobservable heterogeneity to have different distributions for private and public providers. This assumption allows us to use provider fixed effects to control for unobservable provider characteristics -with the same distribution in the two sectors--and some that we do not attribute to ownership spurious effects due to other factors. Hausman tests confirm that unobserved hospital heterogeneity is correlated with the errors so that in the absence of hospital Fixed Effects the estimated coefficients would be biased in all cases except that of the "Prompt discharge" factor. Also note that because the ISTC variable is an estimated probability in the switching regression model, its value varies across patients of the same hospital.
unmeasured and common differences in the characteristics of patients who were treated by different providers. At the same time, we leave room for selection between public and private providers according to unobservable patient characteristics that vary across providers but are common to a given provider's patients. If instead we had assumed complete homogeneity of patients' unobservable characteristics across providers, we would be implicitly assuming random assignment between private and public providers. In formal terms, we assume that the unobservable patient heterogeneity is related to the choice of type of hospital so that
are not zero.
The importance of considering hospital fixed effects is twofold. On the one hand, it makes it possible to capture the unobserved hospital characteristics and any omitted variable at the hospital level. On the other hand, as Glick (2009) We can obtain estimates of 1  and 0  by following the two-stage estimation method for switching regression models (Maddala 1983 ). In this model and allowing for provider fixed effects, the predicted score for patient experience is obtained as: The estimation of the model is done in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate a probit model of the choice between NHS hospitals and ISTCs, allowing for different variances for different hospitals. In the second stage, we estimate the switching regression model for each one of the eight dimensions of experience considered. We estimate this model both with and without hospital fixed effects 17 .
In practice, the Fixed Effects specification largely controls for selection both on hospital unobservables and patient unobservables within the hospital. We introduce the patient selection equation in order to ensure that our estimates are robust to patient selection based on unobservables that vary across hospitals. 18 The number of specialties of the hospital is included in the probit equation as the exclusion restriction, in order to ensure identification. The validity of this instrument relies on it not being correlated with the errors in the patient experience equation. The number of specialties restricts the choice of hospital, but it is unlikely to affect random disturbances to non-clinical patient experience once we control for each hospital specialty and for the other characteristics of the individual hospital, as we do in the patient experience equations. 19 At the same time, the predictive power of the number of specialties in the choice equation is strong. The coefficient of the number of specialties is strongly significant in the probit equation, and the model has a pseudo-R-square of 0.74, which falls to 0.40 if we drop the number of specialties from the model. Part of the predictive power of this variable is due to the higher average number of 17 We only present the estimates incorporating hospital fixed effects here. Results of estimations without hospital fixed effects are available from the authors. 18 We have estimated an exogenous switching model for comparison (though without hospital Fixed Effects because the exogenous switching involves an ownership dummy variable) and find almost identical results as with endogenous switching (without hospital Fixed Effects) for the equations explaining the CQC Domain scores. However there are some significant differences in the average ownership effects obtained for the equations explaining the factor scores. 19 In order to examine the validity of the number of specialties as an instrument in the absence of another suitable instrument that we could use to carry out an overidentification test, we included the variable as an explanatory variable in our model without hospital Fixed Effects, and found that it has no explanatory power for most of the domains or factors. Its coefficient is only significant at the 1% level for the domain "Coordination" (and for the "Prompt discharge" factor at the 5% level). The inclusion of this extra variable does not affect the estimated effects when switching is exogenous, suggesting that using this variable does not bias the coefficient estimates. That the number of specialties is exogenous to the main equations is not surprising because the equations concern non-clinical quality. specialties in the public sector. 20 However, that predictive power is not spurious or entirely due to a difference in numbers of departments devoid of any substantive content. For example, ISTCs have a lower average number of specialties because they specialise in a small number of routine procedures aimed at lighter cases, for whom the availability of ISTC capacity improves access to elective care. This specialisation has raised concerns about clinical safety (Wallace 2006) 
Findings
The estimates of model (4) are presented in Table 4a for the five quality domains defined by the CQC and in Table 4b for the three factors identified by our factor analysis. The first result is that for all dimensions of care quality, the equations estimated for the NHS hospitals and for the ISTCs are significantly different. In other words, the determinants of the quality experienced by patients in each dimension are not the same in the two types of hospital, or affect quality differently. The two types of hospital deliver quality differently, with each type offering better quality, all else being equal, in certain areas in certain specialties or to certain groups of patients. Being in an ISTC affects experienced quality, in each dimension, in a basic way (this is the ISTC fixed effect 22 ) as well as in other ways that are specific to the hospital specialty, and/or to the patient's gender, age and state of health (the parameters corresponding to the variables entered in interaction with the ISTC dummy variable). The selection of patients into a particular type of provider does not affect reported quality levels in the CQC domains (except possibly in the Information one, but the effect is 20 In our sample, the average number of specialties is 3.5 for ISTCs (minimum 1, maximum 7) and 11.3 for NHS hospitals (minimum 1, maximum 22). 21 Here the number of specialties is defined over the whole range of specialties available in public and private hospitals and is not restricted to the nine specialties analyzed. The negative association does not imply causation but simply reflects the fact that ISTCs (for which the ownership dummy variable equals 1) have a smaller number of specialties than public hospitals. 22 The fixed effect of being an ISTC is measured by the coefficient of  capturing the difference between the intercepts of the models for ISTC and NHS hospitals. 19 only weakly significant) 23 . However, among the factors identified by data analysis patient selection does affect the reported quality of experience in the More Information / Less Comfort dimension, i.e., the patients that are directed to ISTCs will report a better experience, all else being equal, in this dimension. This could be because patients with less complex cases generally require less explanations and information about their care.
The top halves of Tables 4a and 4b give the effects of the different determinants on the scores for public hospitals, and the bottom half the difference between those effects and the effects for ISTCs (ISTC fixed effect and effects specific to patient characteristics and hospital specialties).
CQC Domains
If we look at the top half of Table 4a , we see that older patients generally report a better experience in the CQC quality domains than the reference group (men aged 16-35 in General Surgery) in public hospitals, all else being equal. Being a woman is associated with a less good reported experience in four of the five domains, and being in better health with a better one; experience in the Coordination and Information domains is better in some specialties, again all else being equal.
These results are in line with recent international evidence, which shows age and being in better health to have positive effects on reported patient experience and conflicting findings regarding gender effects (Hekkert et al 2009 , Säilä et al 2008 , Quintana et al 2006 , Veenstra and Hofoss 2003 .
Compared with this, being in an ISTC (bottom half of the table) has a positive basic effect in four of the five CQC domains (all except "access"). The magnitudes of these effects are substantial--of around 1 standard deviation for the "relationships" and "comfort" domains 24 . In addition, there are more complex ISTC effects specific to patient characteristics and to six of the hospital specialties.
Being older tends to have a less positive effect on reported experience in ISTCs than in NHS hospitals. In one case, that of 36-50 year-olds, being in that age category even has a negative net effect on quality in the "comfort" domain in ISTCs. This is quite unusual. It is possible that the generally lesser positive effect associated with age in ISTCs reflects a bias in favour of the public sector in older age groups. Being female may have a less negative effect on reported quality in the "coordination" and "information" domains in ISTCs, but the difference is only weakly significant 20 and the net effect of being female remains negative in ISTCs as in NHS hospitals. Rating oneself as being in better health has a much less favourable effect on quality in all domains except for "access" in ISTCs, though the net effect remains positive in all domains. If there was a bias to this estimated effect due to reverse causality (better quality care causing a better state of health) this finding would suggest quality defined in this particular way is less good in ISTCs (and is overestimated). Length of stay has the same effect in ISTCs and NHS hospitals (the ISTC effect is not significantly different from zero). Specialty-specific ISTC effects concern the "coordination" domain (the ISTC effect is positive in Urology and negative in Orthopaedics, ENT and Plastic surgery); "relationships" (negative ISTC effects in Orthopaedics, ENT, Plastic surgery and Gynaecology); "comfort" (positive ISTC effect in Ophthalmology and negative effect in Oral surgery and Gynaecology); and "access", on which there is a positive ISTC effect in Orthopaedics.
Factors
Once again, the picture is slightly different if we look at the determinants of quality along the three dimensions coming out of the factor analysis of all survey questions (Table 4b ). In public hospitals (top half of the table) older age still has a positive effect on reported quality all-round (ages over 50) and along the "more information but less comfort" dimension. However, being female does not affect experience quality, and a better state of health only affects the factor "all-round quality" positively. Ophthalmology is associated with a positive effect on all-round quality, as are Orthopaedics, ENT and Gynaecology for the prompt discharge factor. However, Orthopaedics also has a negative effect on the score for "more information but less comfort", as has Urology.
There is a positive basic ISTC effect on all-round quality of experience, but a negative one on the provision of more information and less comfort. Both effects are quite large. There remains a negative ISTC effect specific to the over-50 age groups on all-round quality, so much so that the net coefficient even becomes negative in ISTCs. The unusual finding of a negative age effect on quality in ISTCs is thus confirmed, which may reflect a lesser consideration for older patients in ISTCs due perhaps to a less intrinsically-motivated workforce, as we had hypothesised, and/or a bias in favour of the NHS among older age groups that would lead those patients to rate NHS organisations systematically better than private-sector ones. A better state of health has a less positive effect on all-round reported quality in ISTCs than in NHS hospitals, but the effect still is a positive one. However, it affects experience positively in the "more information but less comfort" area (as opposed to no effect in NHS hospitals). If there was a bias due to reverse causality in the estimated effect of patients' state of health, this would suggest that by this definition quality may be less good in ISTCs along one dimension, better along another and the same as in NHS in the third dimension. Length of stay has the same effect in ISTCs as in NHS organisations, except possibly in the Prompt Discharge dimension where the net effect may be positive in ISTCs-but both the (negative) effect for NHS hospitals and the positive one for ISTCs are only weakly significant.
Specialty-specific ISTC effects are positive and large enough in the more information / less comfort area in Urology and Orthopaedics to give those two specialties a net advantage (towards information and away from comfort) in this dimension of quality, where they were associated with less good scores in NHS hospitals. Oral surgery is associated with very large ISTC effects-a negative one in all-round satisfaction but a positive one along the Prompt Discharge factor. A positive ISTC effect is also observed for this factor in plastic surgery. Gynaecology is associated with less good all-round reported quality in ISTCs (but not in NHS hospitals).
Total ISTC effects
In order to find out whether hospital ownership has a statistically significant effect overall on the quality of patients' reported experience, we have to evaluate the sum of the basic and specific ISTC effects at the sample means. The resulting effects are presented in Table 5 for The bottom half of Table 5 shows that for the CQC domains, the estimated ISTC effect would be positive in the absence of hospital fixed effects, i.e., if we did not control for confounding effects associated with unobserved characteristics specific of individual hospitals. These characteristics could concern each hospital's resources, its age, etc. This suggests that there are "good" and "bad" hospitals, from the point of view of these characteristics that improve the quality of patient experience, in both sectors, but there are relatively more "good" ones among ISTCs than among NHS hospitals for reasons other than ownership (ownership effects being captured by the ISTC variable). It is interesting to note that this effect is not observed for the equations explaining the three main factors identified by the data analysis among all the survey questions. This suggests that the positive ISTC effect estimated when confounding effects associated with individual hospital characteristics are not taken into account could be an artefact of the selection of the questions included in the CQC's domains and the way these domains are defined 26 .
Patient Sorting
Given the role of patient selection into each type of hospital in explaining certain aspects of the average level of quality of patients' reported experience it is of interest to examine whether the process sorts patients in such a way that patients that would be happier in a particular sector are sent there. It could simply be that patients that would have a better experience anyway, for example because they suffer from only one, straightforward condition, are sent to ISTCs; and/or it could be that patients better suited to a given sector are sent to that sector.
In order to investigate this issue, we have computed, for each group of patients (i.e., those treated in NHS hospitals and those treated in ISTCs) the quality scores the estimated models would predict for each type of hospital. We take the values of explanatory variables for all the patients that were treated in NHS organisations and combine them with the coefficients estimated for each type of hospital to calculate and test whether these patients would give a higher score to NHS hospitals or to ISTCs in each CQC domain and each of our three factors. In other words, we test whether patients treated in NHS hospital would report a better experience, as predicted by our estimated model, if they had been treated in ISTCs. We then repeat the exercise with patients treated in ISTCs. The compared scores and corresponding tests are presented in Table 6 .
The top half of Table 6 presents the scores predicted for patients treated in NHS hospitals, first as predicted by the model estimated on NHS hospitals and then below as predicted by the model estimated on ISTCs. The significance of the difference between the two scores is tested for each dimension with a t-test, presented below the two scores and their standard deviations. The bottom half of the table presents the same values computed for those patients that were treated in ISTCs.
None of the differences are significantly different from zero in the top half of the table: patients that were treated in NHS hospitals would have been no happier and no less happy in ISTCs. Patients treated in ISTCs would also have been just as happy in NHS organisations in all dimensions except for the CQC Access domain, in which they would give NHS organisations a significantly lower score. Two of the three questions in this domain concern change of admission date and time on a waiting list. This result is consistent with the fact that the introduction of ISTCs aimed at creating capacity for routine elective surgery for which there were long waiting lists. There does seem to be successful sorting into ISTCs of patients that would have risked having their date of admission changed and/or been unhappy with the time spent on a waiting list. The Coordination domain shows ISTC patients might have been happier in NHS hospitals, but the difference in scores is only weakly significant (at the 10% level).
Conclusions
This paper set out to investigate whether hospital ownership affected the level of quality reported by National Health Service patients in patient experience surveys in England. Looked at question by question, the surveys we analysed-2007 data for NHS hospitals and 2007/08 data for ISTCsalmost entirely gave a statistically significant advantage to ISTCs. Average scores obtained by NHS and private-sector providers on the five domains defined by the CQC over 20 of the 39 questions showed the same pattern. Interestingly, the picture was a little different when we considered the average scores obtained by the two types of hospitals along three dimensions identified with factor analysis among the 39 survey questions. ISTCs scored better on the All-round Quality and Prompt Discharge factors, but the analysis revealed a pattern in the data in which some hospitals score higher on a series of questions regarding the information provided to patients and relatively lower on questions regarding comfort-cleanliness, noise, etc.-while others scored more highly on questions regarding comfort and relatively less on information questions. Along that dimension, which we called More Information/ Less Comfort, public sector hospitals were closer to the "more information" end and private sector ones to the "comfort" one.
Our empirical approach aimed at separating out, in the observed differences, ownership effects from what could be attributed to patient characteristics that may affect patient experience, to the selection of patients into one of the two types of hospital and to other factors that might affect patientobserved quality, such as the characteristics of individual hospitals other than ownership. For this purpose, we estimated a series of switching-equations models explaining scores obtained at the patient level in several areas of quality, including five domains defined by the Care Quality Commission and the three factors identified by our data analysis. In the estimations, we endogenized the selection of patients into the private or public sector and used hospital fixed effects in order to keep constant the unobserved characteristics of individual hospitals that are not systematically related to ownership. The hospital fixed effects allowed us to avoid estimating spurious effects that might stem from circumstances that happen to have resulted in public and private hospitals often differing in some ways not actually due to ownership.
Our findings indicate that patients' experiences in the two types of hospital are different: the two series of estimated equations are different. Hospital ownership affects experience both generally and in ways that are specific to groups of patients and hospital specialties, with certain aspects being better in one type of hospital or the other for certain groups of patients in certain specialties.
All else being equal, women report a rather less good experience in both types of hospital, but a little less so for two of the CQC domains in ISTCs. NHS hospitals are associated, all else equal, with a better experience for older patients than ISTCs. Certain areas of quality are reported by patients to be better in some specialties in NHS hospitals, others in ISTCs.
Overall, however, the total effect of hospital ownership on the quality of experience reported by patients is not statistically different from zero in any of the eight dimensions of quality of experience we consider. In all dimensions, the average differences in the scores of hospitals in the two sectors can be entirely attributed to differences in the types of patients attending the two hospitals, to the selection of patients into hospitals of one sector or the other, and/or to the characteristics of individual hospitals.
Our results indicate a degree of successful sorting of patients that would benefit from faster access to care by being treated in an ISTC into that sector. However, in most of the quality dimensions we considered, our findings suggest that, once individual hospitals' characteristics are controlled for, patients of either sector would report a similar level of experience if they had been treated in the other sector.
When we analyse the scores obtained on the five CQC domains, we can attribute some differences in experience to observed patient characteristics and specialties, and to the choice of hospital and individual hospitals' characteristics as captured by hospital fixed effects (the selection term does not 25 have a significant effect on those scores). However, we do not know which hospital-specific characteristics are involved in determining the higher level of quality reported on average by patients in ISTCs. These factors could include those aspects of hospital resources, staffing levels and spare capacity, staff qualifications, the age of the premises, etc., that are not systematically related to hospital ownership. It would be interesting now to find out precisely which hospital characteristics are involved and how.
Interestingly, when we analyse the scores on the three main factors identified by the data analysis we performed on the 39 survey questions, we find the characteristics of individual hospitals have no significant effect (whereas the selection of patients into one or the other type of hospital significantly affects the score on the More information / Less Comfort factor). It seems that factor analysis teases out patterns in these data that are mostly independent from individual hospital characteristics. This finding also suggests that the aggregation method used to summarise multiple survey questions may be more important than has been thought until now. (1) In the question about the main reason for delayed discharge, the highest score is given when the discharge is not delayed and the score is zero when the discharge is due to medical or hospital reasons. Predicted scores from Provider's Fixed Effects Model. t-tests run with the standard deviation measured at the mean of X. Standard deviations in parentheses *** Difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level * Difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level
A2 Questions Included in Care Quality Commission's Domains:  Access and waiting
Was your admission date changed by the hospital?
How do you feel about the length of time you were on the waiting list before your admission to hospital?
From the time you arrived at the hospital, did you feel that you had to wait a long time to get to a bed on a ward?  Safe, high quality, coordinated care
Sometimes, a member of staff will say one thing and another will say something quite different. Did this happen to you?
On the day you left hospital, was your discharge delayed for any reason?
Did a member of staff tell you about any danger signals you should watch for after you went home?
 Better information, more choice
Were you involved as much as you wanted to be in decisions made about your care and treatment?
Did a member of staff explain the purpose of the medications you were to take at home in a way you could understand?
Did a member of staff tell you about medication side effects to watch for when you went home?
 Building relationships
When you had important questions to ask the doctor, did you get answers that you could understand?
Did doctors talk in front of you as if you weren't there?
When you had important questions to ask a nurse, did you get answers that you could understand?
Did nurses talk in front of you as if you weren't there?
 Clean, comfortable, friendly place to be Were you ever bothered by noise at night from other patients?
Were you ever bothered by noise at night from hospital staff?
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In your opinion, how clean was the hospital room or ward that you were in?
How would you rate the hospital food?
Were you given enough privacy when being examined or treated?
Overall, did you feel you were treated with respect and dignity while you were in the hospital?
Do you think the hospital staff did everything they could to help control your pain? 39 A3 Selection Equation Hospital choice is not affected by the specialty except in the case of Gastroenterology which favours the choice of an ISTC and in the case of Gynaecology with a 9 percent lower probability of ISTC choice. The higher the length of stay, the lower the probability of being treated in an ISTC. With regard to patient's characteristics, patients older than 35 are more likely to go to an ISTC.
